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Schaffer’s Elucidating Social Science
Concepts: Notes of a
Conceptualist in the Field
Gary Goertz
 University of Notre Dame
I am quite sympathetic to many aspects of the anthropological
and ethnographic approach defended by Fred Schaffer in his
Elucidating Social Science Concepts: An Interpretivist
Guide.1 Much of my methods work is motivated and informed
by what I call “methodological anthropology,” which I define
as the examination of the practices of social scientists and
philosophers regarding concept formation and construction.
My original interest in concepts started from the observa-
tion that social scientists and philosophers spend a lot of en-
ergy and effort defining, disputing, and thinking about con-
cepts. At the same time, concept methodology was completely
absent from methods, statistics, and research design textbooks.
These have chapters on measurement but nothing about con-
cepts.
Schaffer’s chapter 2 has the subtitle “how people under-
stand a concept.” He focuses on “everyday people” as sub-
jects of his methodology; in contrast, I have focused on social
scientists and philosophers as subjects. This is a major differ-
ence between our interests. For example, in addition to under-
standing social science practice, I give advice to my subjects
(social scientists) on how to do things better. Fred is not tell-
ing everyday people how to do concepts better.
At the same time, I completely agree with almost all the
“lessons” he has for elucidating concepts and would apply
these lessons to my target groups. For example, his postulate
to “investigate ordinary use” is critical because people, in-
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cluding social scientists, do all kinds of odd things with con-
cepts. This analysis is critical in producing better social sci-
ence concepts. “Compare the use of the same word in different
language games” means, for example, that one should look at
how political theorists or philosophers work on a concept, say
democracy, versus quantitative social scientists. “Examine
opposites and negations” is absolutely essential to distin-
guishing between what I call the positive and negative poles.
Terminology is critical and signals all sorts of issues. For ex-
ample, social scientists cannot agree on what to call “not-
democracy” and this has varied over time, with popular op-
tions like monarchy (19th century), dictatorship,2 authoritar-
ian, totalitarian, etc. So I completely endorse his recommenda-
tion to “follow the clouds of etymology.”
In short, much of Schaffer’s ethnographic advice works
very well in understanding how social scientists develop and
use concepts.
Much of chapter 3 resonated with me as well. The analy-
sis of historical developments and genealogy is critical to un-
derstanding social science concepts. For example, one cannot
understand the polity or Freedom House datasets without an
understanding of their history. Many things that seem odd or
curious about these datasets arise from the fact that they were
not meant to capture concepts of democracy at the beginning!
They have evolved and been adapted over time, but still retain
traces of their origins. Freedom House was about the concept
of liberty—social, economic, and political. It eventually
morphed into a democracy dataset. The polity concept of
anocracy, which is now used to refer to competitive-authori-
tarian regimes, originated in the concept of anarchy.3
In short, much of chapters 2 and 3 is directly relevant to
thinking about how social scientists and philosophers develop,
debate, and use concepts and is good advice to all those inter-
ested in concept methodology.
Chapter 4 is about “elucidating power.” A good example
of this practice is the literature on gender and politics because
one of the first moves of a gender scholar is to deconstruct
and analyze the gender bias of traditional concepts. For ex-
ample, it is fascinating to see how the World Bank conceptual-
izes “indigenous people,” a concept that is very politicized
and that has large real-life implications for these peoples. The
discussion in the literature is reminiscent of Foucault talking
about an institutionalization of “insanity-madness” (folie in
the 18th century). To apply this practice more broadly, theories
involving democracy and democratization would probably re-
quire some significant changes if women’s voting were in-
cluded in the major concepts and datasets, where women are
quite notable by their absence.4 The same issue applies to
minorities, e.g., African-Americans, in democracy concepts and
datasets: for example, the USA in 1920 is coded a maximal de-
mocracy by polity.
Schaffer contrasts “positivist reconstruction” with
“interpretivist elucidation.” What “positivism” means is a hotly
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contested concept itself. I see Schaffer as engaged in positiv-
istic empirical research. His long discussion about what “fam-
ily” means in different cultures is meant to be an accurate
representation of these differences.
So Schaffer and I agree on many points dealing with the
semantics of concepts. We part ways on the role of concepts
in describing the world and their use in explaining how the
world works. His book stresses the value of understanding
how people use concepts and what they mean by various
concepts. But concepts have an instrumental value as well.
We can ask how well they describe the world and if they are
useful in explaining the world.
The biggest difference between us lies in the role of expla-
nation, causation, and causal hypotheses. I am interested in
concepts because they are essential in describing the world,
but also very much because they are core to explaining the
world. This of course makes me a “positivist,” but some
interpretivists also want to explain the world.5 Causal explana-
tion is the goal of my main target group, social scientists, and
is my goal in my substantive work. I work from the philosophy
that high quality concepts are critical to high quality social
science. Bad concepts, e.g., terrorism, lead to bad research. A
very big chunk of my applied work over the years involves
very serious conceptual analysis. Before I can explain interna-
tional peace I needed to think very hard about the concept of
peace.6 To analyze how people, say Wolofs in Gambia, differ in
their concept of democracy, is interesting to me if that some-
how “matters.” Mattering is that it influences behavior or is
influenced by something. These are causal questions. I am
interested in differences in meaning and concepts, but only
those that somehow matter in causal explanations, hypoth-
eses and theories.
The title of Schaffer’s book indicates that it is about “so-
cial science” concepts. To advance social science we need to
know how interpretivist methodologies of concepts help or
relate to causal explanations and hypotheses.
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Commanding a Clear View:
Words, Concepts, and Social Science
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson
 American University
To lay my cards on the table at the outset: I am broadly sympa-
thetic to Frederic Schaffer’s overall campaign in favor of con-
ceptual elucidation: “investigating the ways in which the so-
cial world is built up linguistically and the ways in which social
actors deploy concepts to pursue their goals.”1 On numerous
previous occasions I have been, like Schaffer, decidedly criti-
cal of scholarly efforts to “fix” the meaning of a concept (like
the West or civilization) and then to use that scholarly recon-
struction as a base from which to legislate appropriate and
inappropriate practical claims using that concept—as though
our task as scholars were to correct the social world rather
than to explain and understand it. So Schaffer’s careful explica-
tion of techniques for elucidation, grouped under the head-
ings of “grounding,” “locating,” and “exposing,” provides a
refreshing alternative to the sort of advice about concept analy-
sis one typically receives from scholars engaged in the kind of
project I think rather problematic.
That said, in my view Schaffer’s book also illustrates—
practically and performatively if not deliberately—an impor-
tant liability of his approach to concepts. The version of
“interpretivism” that emerges from his account, while grounded
in how people in the field conventionally use the word, ob-
scures rather than clarifies important philosophical distinc-
tions between theory, methodology, and method, and shores
up philosophically misleading but practically operative di-
chotomies opposing “interpretivism” to “positivism” as if those
were coherent intellectual packages. Despite conventional use,
I do not believe that “positivism” and “interpretivism” name
such coherent packages. For that reason I do not believe that
the only alternative to reconstructing a concept so that it can
be inserted into a statistical study as an independent or de-
pendent variable—which is the so-called “positivist” strat-
egy—necessarily means taking on all three of Schaffer’s “sets
of interpretivist questions”2 about ranges of meaning, linguis-
tic and historical specificity, and political context. By adhering
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